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Differently from most European countries and despite the recommendations on the part of the 
EC, Italy still misses a sufficiently systematic and nationwide mechanism of income support, 
although various selective or conditional income maintenance policies are operating and some 
local authorities are experimenting forms of minimum income policy. However, the current 
economic recession has put much stress on the current income support policies, thus revealing 
their shortcomings with respect to both efficiency and equity: the evidence about the undesirable 
implications of the current policies might produce a more favourable climate for debating about 
the redesign of the income support mechanisms with a universalistic approach.  
In this paper we empirically explore the feasibility and the “optimal” features of a 
universal policy of income support in Italy. We aim at designing an income support mechanism 
that replaces the actual policies and has desirable properties in terms of households’ welfare and 
incentives, subject to a public budget constraints and taking into account the households’ new 
choices vis-a-vis  the new opportunities and constraints introduced by the reforms.
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2. The current system and the reforms 
Current Italian income support policies can be classified as contingent interventions (such as 
unemployment benefits) and structural (or anti-poverty) interventions. The contingent 
interventions suffer from three main undesirable features: (a) being they more aimed at 
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preserving the job rather than the worker’s income and opportunities,  the labour reallocation 
from unprofitable jobs to more promising ones is severely discouraged; (b) they are limited to 
certain sector and types of contract, thus generating social exclusion and processes of the insider-
outsider type; (c) often some of the contingent interventions have to go through a bargaining 
process involving firms, unions and local or central authorities, thus adding more sources of 
potential inequities.  
The anti-poverty interventions are mainly aimed at supporting low pensions, disabled 
people and low-income families with a mean-tested transfer (Assegno per il Nucleo Familiare) 
which is however limited to wage employees. Embodied in the personal income taxation system 
there are also tax credits and child benefits that can be classified as anti-poverty policies. It has 
been observed that the design of the mean-tested tax credits and child benefits create distortions 
and bad incentives for labour market participations of married women (Colonna and Marcassa, 
2011).  
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that the current Italian system of income support 
policies, although costly, is defective with respect to both efficiency goals (e.g. minimizing 




In this paper we will consider various versions of hypothetical income support policies 
that – differently from the current policies described above – are universal, meaning that they are 
not conditional upon professional or occupational categories or on bargaining or contingent 
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 See for example Baldini et al. (2002), Boeri and Perotti (2002) and Sacchi (2005). In June 2012 the Italian 
Parliament has approved a reform of the income support institutions that features some measures inspired by more 
universalistic principles although the basic characteristic of the system are not affected.   
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financial constraints. As it is typically the case with universal policies, they are financed by 
general taxes. These reforms are stylized cases representative of the different scenarios that are 
discussed or even actually implemented in many countries.
3
 In the following description of the 
policies there appears a “threshold” G: it is a fraction (alternatively, 50%, 75%, 100%) of the 
poverty line adjusted for the household’s size.
4
  
Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI). Each individual receives a transfer equal to G – I (if 
single) or G/2 – I (if partner in a couple) provided I < G (or I < G/2), where I denotes individual 
taxable income and G is some fraction of the poverty level (0.50, 0.75, 1.00). This is a simple 
version the standard conditional guaranteed basic income, implemented in many countries.  
Expected drawbacks: poverty trap, high monitoring ad administration costs. Expected benefits: 
targeting the deserving population. 
Unconditional Basic Income (UBI). Each individual receives an unconditional transfer equal to 
G (if single) or G/2 (if partner in a couple). This is the pure version of Basic Income, 
implemented in Alaska, expected to be implemented in Brazil, currently experimented in local 
areas of Africa, India and South America. Expected drawbacks: high taxes. Expected benefits: no 
poverty trap, low monitoring and administration costs. 
Wage Subsidy (WS). Each individual receives a 10% subsidy on the gross hourly wage and 
her/his income is not taxed as long as her/his gross income (including the subsidy) does not 
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De Vincenti and Paladini (2009), Colombino et al. (2010), Figari (2011), De Luca et al. (2012).  
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exceed G if single or G/2 if partner in a couple. Close to currently fashionable policies such as 
Earned Income Tax Credit and In-Work Benefits (USA, UK, Sweden). Expected drawbacks: 
little impact on poverty of “hard” non-participants. Expected benefits: incentives to participate, 
reduction of welfare dependence. 
GMI + WS and UBI + WS are mixed mechanisms where the transfer is coupled with the wage 
subsidy and the threshold G is halved with respect to the pure types. They might be interpreted as 
an attempt to merge the benefits and cancelling the drawbacks of the transfer-based (GMI and 
UBI) and the subsidy-based (WS) policies.
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For each one of the above five types of mechanisms, we consider three versions where G 
is alternatively defined as 50%, 75% or 100% of the poverty line. Altogether we have therefore 
15 reforms.  
The income support mechanism is complemented by a progressive tax that replicates the 
current system: the marginal tax rates are applied to the whole income exceeding G (or G/2) and 
proportionally adjusted in the simulation in order to fulfil the public budget constraint.  
 
3. Simulation 
In order to simulate and evaluate the effects of the reforms we have developed and 
estimated a microeconometric model of household labour supply using a sample of Italian 
couples and singles. The model makes it possible to simulate the new labour supply choices made 
by the households given the new incentives and constraints implied by the different hypothetical 
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reforms. The estimation and the simulation are based on a dataset generated by the EUROMOD 
algorithm
6
 from a sample of couple and single households of the Bank-of-Italy’s Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) for the year 1998.
7
 Both partners of couple households 
and heads of single households are aged 20 – 55 and are wage employed, self-employed, 
unemployed or inactive (but students and disabled are excluded). As a result of the above 
selection criteria we are left with 2955 couples, 366 single females and 291 single males.
8
 
Each reform defines a new budget constraint for each household. The simulation consists 
of running the model after replacing the current budget constraint with the reformed one. The 
procedure adopted in this paper has two distinctive features that are not common in the tax 
reform literature. First, the reforms are simulated under the constraint of being fiscally neutral, 
i.e. they generate the same total net tax revenue as the current system. Second, the simulation is 
conducted under market equilibrium conditions. In general the reforms induce a shift of the 
labour supply curve. Equilibrium in the labour market then requires an adjustment of the wage 
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  EUROMOD is a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European Union that enables researchers and policy 
analysts to calculate, in a comparable manner, the effects of taxes and benefits on household incomes and work 
incentives for the population of each country and for the EU as a whole. EUROMOD was originally designed by a 
research team under the direction of Holly Sutherland at the Department of Economics in Cambridge, UK. It is now 
developed and updated at the Microsimulation Unit at ISER (University of Essex, UK). 
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 More recent surveys are of course available. However, the years following 2000 envisage a more turbulent 
macroeconomic scenario with respect 1998. In any case, the analysis presented in this paper is a comparative statics 
exercise: it concerns the evaluation and design of institutions, i.e. policies that should be assumed to stay for a 
relatively long period; as a counterpart, preferences should be assumed to be stable. 
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 The microeconometric model is similar to the one used in Colombino et al. (2010) and it is fully explained in 








The model allows us to compute an index of household welfare, i.e. how well-off is each 
household given a specific reform. Then we can compute the Gini Social Welfare (GSW) index 
as follows:  
(Average Household Welfare) × (1 – Gini index of the distribution of Household Welfare). 
Intuitively, each household gets a slice of the “cake”; the first term is the average size of the slice 
and can be interpreted as a measure of efficiency; the second term tells us how equal the slices 




4. Results and concluding remarks 
Table 1 reports some results of the simulations. The policies are ranked in descending 
order (the best one at the top) according to the GSW index defined in Section 3. The reforms are 
identified by the content of the first two columns: the income support mechanism (GMI etc.) and 
the coverage, i.e. the value of G (defined in Section 2) as a percentage of the poverty line. For 
example, (UBI+WS, 75) denotes a policy where the income support mechanism is UBI+WS and 
G is 75% of the poverty line. 
The best policy – according to the GSW criterion – turns out to be UBI+WS with a 75% 
coverage. It pays an average monthly transfer equal 721 Euros (comprehensive of the 
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 A similar intuitive idea was originally introduced by Sen (1976). A formal treatment of a more general classo f 
social welfare indexes is provided by Aaberge (2007). 
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unconditional transfer and of the wage subsidy). It leads to reduction of the head count poverty 
rate from 4.33% to 0.95%. Under this reform, 69% of the households would be better-off. The 
reform requires a 50.2% top marginal tax rate (and an analogous increase in the other marginal 
tax rates as well). Of course the reform could be financed through different channels such as 
taxes on consumption, property taxes, taxes on capital etc. 
All the simulated reforms turn out to dominate the current system in terms of social 
welfare gain: therefore we have a large set of alternatives to choose among according to different 
criteria.  For example, reforms of the GMI, WS or GMI+WS type on the one hand require a 
lower marginal tax burden, on the other hand are less effective (with respect to UBI or UBI+WS) 
in reducing poverty.   
The mechanisms envisaging unconditional transfers (UBI or UBI+WS) rank better than 
the mean-tested systems. The greater generosity of the unconditional transfers is compensated by 
the lack of poverty-trap effects, so that both the conditional and the unconditional systems imply 
very modest reductions in labour supply; however, the unconditional systems perform better in 
favouring distributional equity and reducing poverty.  
The typical objections against universalistic policies of income support are based on the 
expectation of strong disincentive effects on labour supply and high tax rates required by the 
public budget constraint. The first expectation (strong disincentive effects on labour supply) is 
not supported by our results. We observe a modest reduction of male labour supply and actually 
an increase in female labour supply.
11
 The second expectation (high marginal tax rates) instead is 
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 An increase in female labour supply in response to the introduction of minimum income policies is not infrequent 
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confirmed by our results. UBI+WS_P_0.75 would require a top marginal tax rate equal to 50.2%, 
to be compared with the 43.7% required by the current system. It should be noticed however that 
these figures are high but not at all unrealistic, particularly when compared to the top marginal 
tax rates in the Scandinavian countries.  Even if the above tax rates were judged for some reasons 
not feasible (possibly from the point of view of political consensus), it must be remembered that 
the menu of welfare improving reforms is very large and contains policies requiring lower 
marginal tax rates. Moreover, instead of increasing the marginal tax rates on income, one might 
think of a different structure of taxation e.g. increasing taxes on wealth and on (selected) 
consumption expenditures.  
In conclusion, a universal income support for Italy appears to be feasible and beneficial, 
with a large menu of choices available to the policy makers. According to the GSW criterion, the 
best policy is a combination of an unconditional transfer (UBI) with a wage subsidy (WS).   
  
                                                                                                                                                              
the 70s. There are many possible explanations: among not employed women, leisure might be an inferior good; the 















































Head Count  
Poverty Ratio 
(%) 
UBI+WS 0.75 69 1011 2043 50.2 721 0.95 
UBI+WS 0.5 66 1014 2045 49.2 599 2.52 
WS 0.75 61 1021 2046 46.5 353 3.66 
WS 0.5 72 1021 2047 46.6 353 4.14 
GMI+WS 0.5 70 1013 2046 47.6 406 3.40 
GMI+WS 0.75 70 1010 2045 48.3 435 2.38 
WS 1 57 1020 2046 47.9 352 3.04 
UBI 0.5 68 1003 2041 50.8 568 0.52 
UBI 0.75 67 994 2038 55.2 814 0.04 
UBI+WS 1 68 1005 2040 52.9 842 0.20 
UBI 1 64 985 2034 59.7 1060 0.00 
GMI 0.5 58 1005 2044 45.7 193 2.48 
GMI+WS 1 57 1005 2043 50.6 467 0.79 
GMI 0.75 60 997 2042 47.2 268 0.81 
GMI 1 48 988 2039 51.1 355 0.01 
Current --- 945 2063 43.7 107 4.33 
(*) Coverage = Policy threshold G as a percentage of the Poverty Level. 
(**) Annual Average Welfare Gain = Change in Gini-Sen SWF divided by the number of households. 





Aaberge, R. (2007) Gini’s Nuclear Family, Journal of Economic Inequality, 5 (3), 305-322. 
 
Aaberge, R., U. Colombino and S. Strøm (2004) Do More Equal Slices Shrink the Cake? An 
Empirical Evaluation of Tax-Transfer Reform Proposals in Italy, Journal of Population 
Economics, 17 (4), pp. 767-785. 
 
Baldini, M., Bosi, P. and S. Toso (2002) Targeting Welfare in Italy: Old Problems and 
Perspectives of Reform, Fiscal Studies, 23, 51-75. 
 
Boeri, T. and R. Perotti (2002) Meno pensioni, più Welfare, Il Mulino, Bologna.  
 
Colombino, U. (2011a) Five issues in the design of income support mechanisms. The case of 
Italy, IZA Discussion Paper No. 6059, http://ftp.iza.org/dp6059.pdf. 
 
Colombino, U. (2011b) Designing a universal income support mechanism in Italy. An 
exploratory tour, Department of Economics Cognetti De Martiis, Working Paper No. 12/2011,  
www.de.unito.it.  
 
Colombino, U. (2012) Equilibrium simulation with microeconometric models. A new procedure 
with an application to income support policies, Department of Economics Cognetti De Martiis, 
Working Paper No. 09/2012, www.de.unito.it. 
 
Colombino, U., M. Locatelli, E., Narazani and C. O’Donoghue (2010) Alternative Basic Income 
Mechanisms: An Evaluation Exercise with a Microeconometric Model, Basic Income Studies, 
5(1). 
 
Colonna, F. and S. Marcassa (2011) Taxation and Labor Force Participation: The Case of Italy, 
mimeo, Bank of Italy. 
 
De Luca, G., Rossetti, C. And D. Vuri (2012) In-work benefit policies for Italian married 
couples: design and labor supply effects, mimeo, ISFOL. 
 
De Vincenti, C. and R. Paladini (2009) Personal Income Tax Design for Italy: Lessons from the 
Theory, Rivista Italiana degli Economisti, XIV, 1, 7-46.  
 
Figari, F. (2011) From housewives to independent earners: Can the tax system help Italian 
women to work?, ISER Working Paper No. 2011-15. 
 




Sacchi, S. (2005) Reddito minimo e politiche di contrasto alla povertà in Italia, Rivista del Diritto 
e della Sicurezza Sociale, 4, 467-509. 
 
Sen, A. (1976) Real National Income, Review of Economic Studies, 43 (1), 19-39. 
 
